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Abstract

The most prominent exception to the cardinal 'most favoured nation'
principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 is in
its Article XXIV relating to Customs·Unions (CU's) and Free Trade Areas
(FTA's).

This article required, first, the general incidence of the duties

and regulations of commerce imposed by members of the CU with respect to trade
with non-members shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than
those that were applicable prior to the formation of CU or FTA, and, second,
that substantially all the trade among members be free.

Neither requirement

was very operational, with the phrases 'general incidence' and 'substantially
all' being difficult legal concepts to apply.

The agreement of 1994

establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) has made "general incidence"
precise by defining it import-weighted average of height of barriers but
without offering any rationale for the definition.

Now that preferential

trading arrangements such as FTA's are proliferating, reform of Article XXIV
is of importance.

This paper describes alternative approaches to the central

question of common external tariffs of a CU.

Taking off from the work of Kemp

and Wan who showed the existence of a common external tariff of CU that keeps
the welfare of non-members unchanged while revising that of the CU as compared
to the situation prior to the formation of CU, it characterizes such a tariff
structure for two leading benchmark examples as consumption-weighted average
of pre-union tariffs and subsidies in the member countries.
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1.

Introduction
The most favoured nation principle (or MFN principle as it is usually

called) is enshrined in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) concluded in 1947 and is considered by all to be the foundation
of the agreement. 1

Yet GATT has allowed several exceptions to MFN principle

such as, for example, its "grandfathering" of pre-existing preferential trade
arrangements, the notorious regime of discriminatory quantitative restrictions
on trade in textiles called the multi-fibre arrangement, and the waiver
granted to developing countries under the "enabling clause" of the Tokyo Round
Agreement of 1979 for providing preferential access to other developing
countries to their markets.

However, the most prominent exception is in its

Article XXIV relating to the Customs Unions (CU's) and Free Trade Areas
(FTA's), since by their very definition both clearly involve preferential
treatment of the trade among members of such arrangements as compared to their
trade with non-members.

Two essential features of the article as it relates

to a Customs Union are:
"
(i) ... with respect to a customs union, or an
interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs
union, the duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed at the institution of any such union or
interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting
parties not parties to such union or agreement shall
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than
the .general incidence of the duties and regulations of
commerce applicable in the constituent territories
prior to the formation of such union or the adoption
of such interim agreement'
(ii) duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in
1 Ironically,

from a strictly economic perspective there is nothing to
recommend non-discrimination among trade partners, as Harry Johnson (1976)
pointed out long ago!
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products originating in such territories
(1994), pp. 523-524, emphasis added]

II

[GATT

The article made it clear that any contracting party of the GATT deciding to
enter into a CU or FTA or an interim agreement towards that end shall promptly
notify the other contracting parties of their intentions to do so and,
presumably, to agree to abide by the requirements of the article XXIV.
It has been suggested that by insisting that the departure from MFN be
extreme with respect to trade among members in that substantially all of it
had to be free and also requiring that the general incidence of barriers on
trade with non-members is not raised, the intention of the drafters of GATT
was to make it very difficult to form a CU or FTA.

Yet the history of

consideration of notifications of such arrangements and actions on them by the
contracting parties is one of evasion, rather than strict enforcement, of the
provisions of Article XXIV.

For example, in the case of the most celebrated

such agreement, namely the Rome Treaty of the European Economic Community, the
GATT 'blinked', according to Finger (1993, p. 137).

He quotes from a report

of a GATT (1959, p. 70) committee that considered the issue:
"[T]he Committee felt that it would be more fruitful
if attention could be directed to specific and
practical problems, leaving aside for the time being
questions of law and debates about the compatibility
of the Rome Treaty with Article XXIV of the General
Agreement."
It is clear that even if the contracting parties wished to enforce
Article XXIV they would have run into difficulties.

As Jackson (1989, p. 141)

points out, the requirements that substantially all trade among members be
free -and the common external tariff
"be not "on the whole" more restrictive than the
"general incidence of" duties and regulations before
the CU was formed ... however, [are] difficult legal
concepts to apply, and have caused much controversy in
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the GATT. In addition, the GATT exception allows an
"interim agreement"--one which leads to a CU or FTA
within a reasonable time--to depart from MFN. This
has opened a loophole of considerable size, since
almost any type of preferential agreement can be
claimed to fall within the exception for "interim
agreement," and "reasonable time" is exceedingly
imprecise."
The agreement concluding the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations signed in April 1994 at Marrakesh included an understanding with
respect to the interpretation of Article XXIV.

It clarified that for purposes

of comparison,
"
the general incidence of the duties and other
regulations of commerce applicable before and after
the formation of a customs union shall in respect of
duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment
of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties
collected. This assessment shall be based on import
statistics for a previous representative period to be
supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis
and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO
country of origin. For this purpose, the duties and
charges to be taken into consideration shall be the
applied rates of duty."
The substitution of the vague phrase "general incidence" by a much more
precise criterion for comparison of pre- and post-union tariff structures is
to be welcomed.

However no rationale for proposed criterion is offered.

Nor

is it established that one can infer how the interests of non-members are
affected by the formation of CU by using the suggested comparison.
The reform of Article XXIV began to attract scholarly attention largely
because of a revived interest since the late eighties in free trade areas and
other preferential trading arrangements (PTA's). 2

2Among

Between the initiation of

recent contributors to the literature related to Article XXIV are
Bhagwati (1991, 1993), Bond et al. (1995), Finger (1993), Ju and Krishna
(1996), McMillan (1993), Roessler (1993), Snape (1993), Syropoulos (1995a,
1995b) and Winters (1996).
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the Uruguay Round in 1986 and the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995 as many as 30 agreements were notified
as compared to 68 agreements notified in the previous four decades (WTO
(1995a), Appendix Table I,A). · The belief that such a revival was a passing
phenomenon reflecting primarily a gloomy assessment (at the time of its mid
term review in December 1988) of the prospect of successfully concluding the
Uruguay Round negotiations, and the fear that the global trading system will
break up into warring trade blocs, turned out to be mistaken.

The interest in

PTA's gathered further steam, rather than wane, even after the successful
conclusion of the UR negotiations.

In fact, since the establishment of WTO,

12 more agreements have been notified (WTO (1995b), p. 12).

As such, the

reform of Article XXIV continues to be a matter of concern.

Among the issues

currently being raised is the central question of the common external tariffs
of a customs union.

What should be the structure of such tariffs?

In what follows, I first briefly describe alternative approaches to this
central question, in particular, whether the relevant issue should be one of
the height of the post-union barriers on trade with non-members or one of
post-union welfare of non-members (Section 2).

Kemp and Wan (1976) in their

celebrated article take the latter approach and showed the existence of a
post-union tariff structure for a customs union (of any arbitrary collection
of members of a global trading system) that is global welfare improving, as
long as lump sum income transfers among members of the union are feasible. 3
Such a tariff structure, in comparison to the pre-union world equilibrium,
maintains the welfare of each resident of non-union members while increasing

3

For comparing alternative trading equilibria from a global welfare
perspective, Pareto ranking is used.
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the welfare of at least one resident of a member of the union.

The Kemp-Wan

proposition is of importance in that it shows the existence of a dynamic path
to global free trade through successive enlargements of customs unions, each
enlargement being Pareto-improving over its predecessor.

Along such a path,

the regional approach towards trade liberalization through the formation of
customs unions becomes a "building-block" rather than a "stumbling block," to
use Bhagwati's (1991) apt phrases, in the march

towards global free trade.

I

go beyond the Kemp-Wan proof of the existence of such a common tariff
structure by characterizing it for two benchmark examples in terms of an
appropriately defined average of different pre-union tariffs of members.

Such

an average is not only as well-defined as the average specified in the Uruguay
Round version of Article XXIV, but unlike the latter it has a welfare content
in addition.

I show this using a Ricardian model of a three-country trading

world in Section 3.

In Section 4, I show analogous results hold in a model

with a more complex production technology as long as all countries all
countries have identical Samuelson social utility functions of the Cobb
Douglas type.

I also address the issue of the intra-union transfers

associated with the Kemp-Wan tariff, an issue which is elegantly illustrated
for a special case in Donald Davis's discussion of this paper.

2.

Alternative Approaches to Common External Tariffs
Jacob Viner (1950), in his justly celebrated analysis of Customs Unions

(CU), distinguished between trade-creating and trade-diverting unions and
implied that the former enhance, and the latter lessen, global welfare.
Although such a welfare implication was shown not to hold in general, the idea
that the formation of a customs union should be judged in terms of its impact
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on global welfare is widely accepted.

The GATT was negotiated and entered

into in 1947 well before Viner's analysis (and long before that of Kemp and
Wan) was published.

It is therefore hard to say whether the negotiators of

the GATT had, without using the Viner's terminology, the same concerns about
trade diversion as Viner or indeed whether like Kemp and Wan they had global
welfare in mind, in insisting that the common tariffs of a CU be no higher
than the general incidence of tariffs of the member countries in the pre-union
situation.

Indeed, if they did, they (and as some, including economists still

do) failed to appreciate that the height of barriers in a CU on its trade with
non-members need not necessarily indicate how global welfare would be affected
by the formation of the CU.
Two of the proposals for reform of Article XXIV are by Bhagwati (1991)
and McMillan (1993).

Bhagwati proposed that a CU should be approved only when

its common external tariff is set at the minimum of the pre-union import
tariffs of the member countries.

An implication of this is that the CU will

engage in free trade with all non-members, if at least one member had a zero
pre-union tariff for each of the traded commodities!

Even if this were not

the case, as I show in Section 3, the Bhagwati proposal could lower welfare of
some members of the CU and raise that of non-members. 4

Since such a

analysis of Syropoulos (1995a) of Nash equilibria of tariff games
(in a symmetric three-country-three commodity world in which two countries
form a CU while still maintaining some tariffs on internal trade) is of
interest in this context. Internal liberalization (i.e. reduction of internal
tariffs) could result in trade deflection and, as such, even if the CU sets
its common tariffs a la Bhagwati's proposal so that there is external trade
liberalization, nonetheless non-members could lose if the adverse trade
deflection effect of internal trade liberalization outweighs the beneficial
effects of external liberalization. Ju and Krishna (1996) analyze free trade
areas without rules of origin. Since this is in effect equivalent to the
adoption of the Bhagwati proposal, their analysis is also relevant. In a FTA
formed by a developing country which (prior to the formation of the FTA) has
higher tariffs on all imports (especially on final goods, they show that
4 The
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possibility could deter the formation of a union, the Bhagwati proposal may
still be treated as a desirable reform which in effect sets a price or hurdle
on WTO members who wish to enter a customs union and thus compromise the MFN
principle.
McMillan (1993) also points out that Article XXIV of GATT 1947
" ... nowhere is it specified how the 'general
incidence' of a set of tariffs is to be measured. Are
before and after tariffs to be compared item by item,
or are average tariffs to be compared? If the latter,
is it a simple average, or a weighted average with
trade volumes as weights?" (p. 299)
He suggests that
"Article XXIV could be made more workable by phrasing
its requirements not in terms of the height of tariffs
but in terms of trade volumes; that is, by looking at
the trade consequences of the restrictions rather
than trying to measure their effect on domestic
prices ... A proposed RIA [Regional Integration
Agreement], in order to get GATT's imprimatur, would
have to promise not to introduce policies that result
in external trade volumes being lowered. And, if after
some years the RIA is seen to have reduced its imports
from the rest of the world, it would be required to
adjust its trade restrictions so as to reverse their
fall in imports." (p. 300)
Measuring trade volumes is certainly more workable.

But changes in aggregate

volumes of trade with non-members need not necessarily indicate changes in
global welfare.

Besides, by substituting outcome variables (viz. trade

welfare of FTA countries is likely to rise, and that of the rest of the world
fall, if the FTA imposes no rules of origin. Bond et al. (1995) consider a
three-country-multi-commodity endowment model with countries having identical
preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution. Two of the countries
form a CU while still maintaining some barriers on internal trade. They ask
whether, in the context.of internal trade liberalization in the two countries
forming a CU, adjustments in their common external tariff to keep unchanged
the terms of trade faced by the outside countries (which they call Kemp-Wan
adjustments) are incentive-compatible for member and non-member countries.
They show that they are not, if the elasticity of substitution between member
and non-member goods in consumer preferences exceeds unity.
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volumes for instrument variables, viz. tariff rates), the McMillan proposal
sanctifies the malodorous "managed-trade" approach to trade policy. 5

On the

other hand the Kemp-Wan approach is based on tariffs that maintain the terms
of trade of unchanged.

-As such each non-member, as long as it maintains its

trade barriers unchanged, will maintain its welfare at the same level as it
was prior to the formation of the CU.

Thus, global welfare has to increase,

since at least one member can be made better off with the formation of the
union without hurting others.

Strictly speaking, the adoption of Kemp-Wan

structure (which is in general not unique) keeps the prices faced by non
members unchanged. 6

This in turn ensures that no one in any non-member

country is adversely affected by the formation of the CU as long as each such
country does not alter its tariffs.

As such, adoption of a Kemp-Wan tariff

structure by a CU is sufficient to ensure that the welfare of non-members is
not adversely affected by its formation.

It is certainly not necessary--after

all, one cannot rule out the possibility that in spite of the change in the
prices faced by non-members incidental to the adoption by a CU of a tariff
structure that differs from a Kemp-Wan structure, welfare of non-members is
not adversely affected.

Also, as Winters (1996) rightly cautions, the Kemp

Wan approach cannot be used as a benchmark to evaluate any proposed tariff
5

1 thank Alan Winters for chiding me for not recognizing this feature of
the McMillan proposal.
6
Kemp and Wan (1993) note that their proposed tariff structure is not
necessarily unique. This can be seen by noting that a Kemp-Wan tariff on a
commodity, being the difference between its domestic price in the CU and its
unchanged world price, will in general depend on which of the many possible
post-union Pareto Optimal allocations within the union is to be sustained as a
competitive equilibrium through intra-union lump sum transfers. Of course if
all consumers have identical homothetic tastes, within union lump sum
transfers will not affect aggregate demand. In such a case we can treat the
union as if it is populated by a single consumer, and provided its competitive
equilibrium is unique, so will be its Kemp-Wan tariff structure.
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structure.

There is no way in general of determining how a deviation from a

Kemp-Wan tariff structure by a CU affects welfare of consumers in any non
member country relative to its level prior to the formation of the Union.

3.

Customs Unions in a Ricardian World: Two Examples
I now turn to the characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs.

Let labour be

the single factor of production with the labour endowment (inelastically
supplied) of country i being Li (i=l,2,3).

Let

af

be the unit labour

requirement of commodity j in country i (i=l,2,3; j=l,2) so that the maximum
possible output

QJ

of good j in country i is

Li/aJ.

Let the Samuelson social

utility function be a Log C1 + (1-a) Log C2 (with O <a< 1) in all three
countries.

In autarky the domestic relative price of good 2 (with good 1 as

numeraire) in country i is 1ri(A)
.advantage be 1r 1 (A) <

1r2 (A)

< 1r3 (A)

=

aJ/af.

Let the ranking of comparative

.

Suppose that, in the initial trading equilibrium, country 1 is
specialized in and exports good 2 to the other two countries which are both
specialized in good 1.
numeraire be 1r(T).

Let the world relative price of good 2 with good 1 as

Let ti be the rate of ad valorem import tariff in country

i so that the prices are as follows:
Good 1

Good 2

1

1r(T)

l+t 1

1r(T)

Country 2

1

(l+t2 )1r(T)

Country 3

1

(l+t 3 )1r(T)

World Price
Domestic Price:

Country 1
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Let tariff revenues be returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion.
Ei(T) be the total expenditure in co.untry i in domestic prices.

Let

Then country

1 spends aE 1 (T) on imports of good 1 from the other two and country i (i=2,3)
spends (1-a)Ei(T) on imports of good 2 from country 1.

As such, the tariff

revenue Ri(T) in country i is given by

Expenditure Ei(T)

= Value

of Production+ Tariff Revenue.

for i

Hence

1,2

Market clearance for good 2 (by Walras' law market for good 1 clears if the
market for good 2 clears) implies that exports from country 1 equals the sum
of imports of countries 2 and 3.

Now

Exports of good 2 from country 1 =

aQJ

1+(1-a) t

1

l

Imports of good 2 by country i

Thus, market clearance requires

l+(l-a)t 1

or

11

'11'(T)

(1)

For the assumed pattern of specialization and trade to be consistent, we
must have '11' 1 (A) < '11'(T) and '11'(T) (l+t 1 ) <
l+t 1

'11' 1 (A)

for i=2, 3.

Having characterized the initial trading equilibrium, the first example
I consider is a CU of countries 2 and 3.

I assume that the outside country,

namely country 1, leaves its tariff unchanged at the same level as it was
prior·to the formation of a CU by.the other two countries.

The objective is

to derive the Kemp-Wan post-union common tariff and characterize it as a
function of pre-union tariffs.

By definition, such a tariff will leave

country l's welfare unchanged at its pre-union level while improving the
welfare of at least one of the members without reducing that of the other.
Since the tariff of country 1 is unchanged, for its welfare to be unchanged,
its terms of trade after the formation of the CU should be the same as before.
With its terms of trade and tariff remaining unchanged, the net exports of
country 1, which in a balanced-trade equilibrium equals the net imports of the
CU, also remains unchanged .

.Given.the net.import.vector,.the CU countries can

choose a production vector that ensures that at least one gains without the
other losing or both gain as compared to the pre-union equilibrium. Thus the
essential step in deriving the Kemp-Wan tariff is to look for a tariff that
leaves post-union terms of trade at their pre-union level.
Suppose the pattern of specialization and trade is unaffected by the
formation of CU.

Any common external tariff t to be consistent with the vague
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provisions article XXIV of GATT 1947, presumably has to satisfy t
t 3)

-

~

Max (t2 ,

t 3 (say). Let the new world relative price of good 2 be 1r(CU).

It is

easy now to see that, with a common external tariff t, and identical tastes in
the two-member countries, imports of good 2 into the union will be
(l-a)E(CU) where E(CU) is total expenditure of the union.
1r(CU) (l+t)
t(l-a)E(CU)
(l+t)

revenue will be

tariff revenue, or E(CU)

=

Hence, tariff

By definition E(CU) • value of production+

~

·c?+ t(l-a)E(CU) so that E(CU)
l+t
i=2 1

l+t
- ....
.........
(l+at)

3

~
i=2

-

Qt.

Substituting this in the expression for imports of good 2, and equating it to

aQi

the exports of good 2 from country 1, i.e. - - - - , we get
l+(l-a)t 1

Qi

,r(CU)

=

rl-a][l+(l-a)t 1 ]

[a""

r~1 ~ Qt
[.L+at 1=2

(2)

From (1) and (2), we get the critical relationship between the post-CU terms
of trade 1r(CU) and the pre-CU terms of trade 1r(T):

(3)

Now clearly the common tariff twill not be set below Min (t2 ,t3 ) = t 2
so that (l+at2 )

weights

cit ,

~

i.e.

(l+at 3 ). If the weighted harmonic mean of (l+ati) with

cit ] '
[l+ati

is greater than (resp. equal to or less
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than) (l+at), then w(CU) will be greater than (resp. equal to or less than)
w(T).
Compare, more intuitively, the import-weighted average t of t 2 , t 3 in
the pre-union situation with the post-union common tariff t.

Now

(4)

so that
(5)

In fact, since there is no domestic production of good 2 in either country, t
is also a domestic consumption weighted average of t 1 and t 2 •
differently, the tariffs ti are simply consumption taxes.

Put

It is appropriate

then that consumption weights are used to average them.

>
>
Comparison of (3) and (5) shows that w(CU) = w(T) according as t = t.
<
<
Of course, if w(CU) > ~(T) the country 1 outside the union gains from the
formation of the union since its terms of trade ~(CU) are better compared to
the pre-union situation and its tariff t 1 is unchanged.
Now, I am in a position to analyse the implications, for the welfare of
nonmembers, of the common external tariffs proposed by Bhagwati and Kemp and
Wan.
(1)

The Kemp-Wan tariff, of course, has no impact on the nonmember

14
country's (i.e. country 1) welfare by assumption.

For this to happen w(CU)

has to equal w(T). -The.common .tariff that brings this about is clearly t
which is unique in this example; the reason being that all consumers within
the union have identical homothetic tastes so that lump-sum income transfers
within the union have no effect on aggregate demand in the union and, for the
·assumed tastes, competitive equilibrium is unique.
average of t 2 and t 3 ,
(2)

t

Being a positive weighted

lies between the two.

The Bhagwati-tariff, which would be at t 2 (the lower of the two

member tariffs in the pre-CU situation), will lead on the other hand to
welfare gain for the country outside the CU.

If there are no internal

transfers within the union, country 2 will lose since·the terms of trade
worsen and its tariff post union is the same as the tariff pre-union.

Country

3 experiences two effects relative to its pre-union situation--a terms of
trade loss but a lowering of import tariff.
transfers, it may gain or lose.

This means that if there are no

Thus, without transfers, the union will not

come about since country 2 will lose from the union.
(3)

It was noted earlier that Article XXIV of GATT 1947 was vague in

specifying how the general incidence of tariffs on trade with non-members in
.the .pre~cu situation is .to be assessed.

The Uruguay Round version does

require that it should be based on an import weighted average of applied
tariffs.

In the present model, tis the weighted average of the applied

tariffs t 2 and t 3 before the CU, using the imports (or equivalently
consumption, since there is no production of the imported good) as weights.
It was shown that as long as the post union common external tariff does not
exceed t, the welfare of the outside country does not go down.

Thus in the
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present model the test proposed in the Uruguay Round version of Article XX.IV
applies.exactly.
Consider now the issue of internal transfers within the CU.

With a

Kemp-Wan tariff in place, the terms-of-trade of the union is the same as that
in the pre-union situation, viz. ~(T).

Also, the trade-vector of the union is

the unchanged trade-vector of the country outside the union.

Thus, given that

the aggregate production vector of the union is unchanged, it follows that the
aggregate consumption vector of the union is unchanged as compared to the pre
union situation.

Hence, the feasible allocation of post-union aggregate

consumption between the two members can be shown in an Edgeworth Box as in
Figure 1.

The length of the horizontal (resp. vertical) side of the box

equals the aggregate consumption of good 2 (resp. good 1) in the pre-union
situation.

Given identical homothetic preferences, the Pareto optimal

allocations of the aggregate consumption between the two countries lie on the
diagonal 0 20 3 with 0 1 representing the origin for measuring consumption of
country i (i=2,3).

The pre-union allocation is at point T, with the

indifference curves U1 (T) (i=2,3) passing through that point.

The slope of

the tangent TT 1 to U1 (T) at T represents the pre-union domestic price
~(T)(l+t1 ) in country i (i=l,2).
the slope of TF.

The terms of trade ~(T) is represented by

The Pareto optimal allocations that are not inferior to T

for either country lie between A2 and A3 •

Of course, along any point on the

diagonal 0 2 0 3 including the stretch A2A3 , the indifference curves of the
countries not only are tangent to each other, but also have the same common
slope, i.e. the slope of A2A4 or A3A5 •

The difference between the slope of the

terms of trade TF and that of A2A4 or A2A5 equals the Kemp-Wan tariff t times
the terms of trade ~(CU) and this does not depend on the post-union allocation
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of consumption.
that t 2 <

t

< t3•

Since T lies to the left of A1 on U1 (T), i = 2,3, it follows
If. the post-union allocation is at A2 , the welfare of

country i (i=2,3) remains at its pre-union situation while the other member of
the union gains.

If the post-union allocation is at some point A between A2
The consumption expenditure of

and A3 both countries gain from the union.

country i is the value of its consumption bundle at the post-union tariff
inclusive price A, i.e. the slope of A2A4 (or A2A5 ).

This is financed by its

income at factor cost (i.e. the value of its production at the same price),
the tariff revenue from its imports and any transfer it receives from the
other country.
The second example relates to a CU between countries 1 and 2 instead of
between countries 2 and 3.

This case is interesting to analyze since, in the

pre-union situation, the two countries are specialized in, and importing,
different commodities.

This is a situation typical of many real world CU's in

which the pre-union trade patterns of members often are very different with
some members exporting commodities which others import.

For concreteness, let

the common external tariff of the CU be the Kemp-Wan tariff.

By definition it

keeps the trade vector of the non-member country 3 unchanged.

Since country 3

is assumed not to change its tariff t 3 , this means its pattern, volume and
terms of trade have to remain unchanged.

In particular it will continue to

export (resp. import) good 1 (resp. good 2).
price of good 2 has to be ff(T), i.e. ff(CU)
good 2 and import good 1.
production.

Thus post-union world relative
ff(T) and the union will export

The interesting issue is its post-union pattern of

Clearly country 1 will continue to produce good 2.

What about

country 2 and what would be the domestic relative price good 2 in terms of
good 1 in the union?
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Given a common post-union Kemp-Wan import tariff ton good 1, its
domestic price in the union (in units of world numeraire) will be (l+t).

The

domestic price in the union of its export good 2 is its world price (in units
of world numeraire) ,r(T).

Since ,r(T)(l+t2 ) <

,r 2 (A)

(the autarky price), a

fortiori ,r(T)/l+t < ,r2 (A) so that country 2 continues to be specialized in
good 1 after its joining a customs union with country 1.

Thus the post-union

production pattern of the union is the same as its pre-union pattern: country
1 specializes in and produces

Q}

units of good 2 and country 2 specializes in

and produces Qf units of good 1.
Let E(CU) be the aggregate expenditure of the union (in world numeraire
units).

Then its demand for its import good, i.e. good 1, is aE(CU)/(l+t),

given identical Cobb-Douglas tastes in the union countries (with a as the
share of expenditure on good 1) and (l+t) being the domestic price of good 1.
The domestic supply of good 1 in the union is Qf so that imports are
aE(CU)/(l+t) - Qf.

Tariff revenue on these imports is t[ aE(U)/(l+t) - Qf ].

The value of domestic production (Qf, Q}) at domestic prices is
(l+t)Qf + ,r(T)Qi.

Hence by definition E(CU) = (l+t)Qf + ,r(T)Q] + t

or
E(CU) = ~ ]

[Qf+,r(T)Q£]

This in turn implies imports of [l+(l~a) t 3JQf+,r(T)Q£] - Qf units of good 1.

(6)
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(l-a)

Equating this with exports

l-at 3

qf

units of good 1 from country 3, yields

or

1

t =

(7)

1-a

Once again the Kemp-Wan tariff t turns out to be unique in this example for
the same reason as mentioned earlier.

=

-at2

l+at 2

Qf

Now

+ (1-a) tl

i

i=2

Qf/(l+ati)

Thus,

t =

(8)
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(9)

l+at 2

Now since country 1 does not produce good 1, it imports it from the
other two countries both of whom export it.

Thus the pre-union consumption of

good 1 in country 1 equals the sum of exports of good 1 by countries 2 and 3,
viz (1-a)

3
Qi
~
i=2 (l+at 1 )

units of it.

.

Country 2 produces only good 2 and exports

Hence, it consumes

2

a(l+t ) units of it.
l+at 2

rate t 2 on imports of good 2 is equivalent to a tax

or a subsidy on its domestic consumption.

t

(1-a)Qf
l+at 2

Now a tariff at the

2

l+t 2

on exports of good 1

As such it is seen from (7) that

the Kemp-Wan tariff (or equivalently tax on consumption) of good 1 in the
post-union situation is the consumption-weighted average of the tax of -

t2

l+t 2

t2 .
(or (subsidy of - - 2) on its consumption in country 2 and tax t 1 on its
l+t

consumption in country 1 in the pre-union situation.
It should be noted that since the two countries forming the CU
(countries 1 and 2) were taxing and importing two different commodities in the
pre-union equilibrium, and in the post-union equilibrium the union imports
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only one of the two (namely good 1), the union's tariff (i.e. the Kemp-Wan
tariff) cannot be expressed as an average with pre-union import weights of
pre-union tariffs on good 1.

By contrast, in a CU of countries 2 and 3, since

both countries did not produce and imported the same good (namely good 2) in
the pre-union equilibrium and continue to do so after they form a union, the
Kemp-Wan tariff could be equivalently expressed as consumption-weighted as
well as an import-weighted average of pre-union tariffs on good 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the algebra.

As in Figure 1, 010 2 with Qi

representing the origin for measuring country i (i=l,2), is the locus of
Pareto Optimal allocations of aggregate consumption between the two members.
The pre-union allocation is at T.

The slope TT 1 of U1 (T) at Tis the pre

union domestic relative price of good 2 ff(T)/l+t 1 in country 1.

Slope TT 2 of

U2 (T) at Tis the pre~union domestic price ff(T)(l+t 2 ) in country 2.
of trade ff(T) is the slope of TF.

The terms

The post-union Pareto optimal allocations

not inferior to T for either country are between A1A2 .

At any of these

allocations the domestic relative price of good 2 (i.e. ff(T)/(l+t) is the
slope of U1 (T) at A1 , i.e. the slope of A1A4 which is also the slope of U2 (T)
at A2 , i.e. the slope of A2A5 •

From the diagram it is obvious that t<t 1 and

l+t 2 > 1/l+t since T lies to the left of Ai on Ui(T), i=l,2.

If the post

union allocation is at Ai (i=l,2), the welfare of country i remains as in the
pre-union situation and that of the other country increases.

At any point in

between, such as A, both gain whatever be the chosen allocation between A1 and
A2 , the net transfer received by country i is the difference between the cost
of its consumption (valued at post-union domestic prices) and the sum of the
value of its production at the same prices and the tariff revenue from its
imports.

The sum of the net transfers of the two countries equals zero by
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definition.
The message from the two exa.D1ples is that the common post CU Kemp-Wan
tariff is the pre-union-consumption weighted average of the pre-union taxes
(or subsidies) on the commodity imported in the post-union equilibrium.

In

the case where this commodity is imported and not produced in the pre-union
equilibrium by both countries forming the union, the Kemp-Wan tariff is also
the pre-union-import-weighted average of pre-union import tariffs.

It is

shown below that a version of the consumption-weighted average
characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs emerges when we generalize the Ricardian
model.

4.

A General Production Model
The Ricardian Model of production in Section 3 together with identical

Cobb-Douglas social utility functions in the three countries enabled the
explicit computation of pre- and post-union equilibria algebraically.

Since

the Ricardian production technology is very special, it is worth examining the
robustness of the characterization of the Kemp-Wan tariff as the consumption
weighted average of pre-union consumption taxes to changes in production
technology.

In this section a general production technology (possibly

different in different countries) involving the production of n (n

~

1)

commodities in each country from an inelastically supplied factor endowment of
that country is implicitly assumed.

However, all countries are assumed to

have the same Cobb-Douglas social utility function.
Let Qi(T) and Qi(CU) denote the output vectors of the ith member of the
union (i-1,2, ... I) in the pre- and post-union equilibria respectively.

Let

~(T) be the equilibrium world prices and M(T) the net imports of the union in
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the pre-union equilibrium.

Let ti be the vector of ad valorem tariffs in

country i·in the pre-union equilibrium so that the domestic price 11'~(T) of
good j in country i is 11'j(T)(l+tf).
exported) by country i, a positive
export subsidy). · A negative

tf

Clearly if commodity j is imported (resp.

tf

is to be viewed as an import tax (resp.

(which cannot be less than minus one) is an

import subsidy (resp. export tax) by the same token.
returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion.

Let tariff revenue be

Given identical Cobb-Douglas

tastes, aggregate demand in each country depends only on prices and aggregate
expenditure Ei(T).

Now Ei(T) is the sum of the value of production at

domestic prices and tariff revenues.

The net imports MJ(T) of commodity j in

country i is by definition the difference between domestic consumption cf(T)
and output QJ(T).

With aj denoting the share of expenditure on commodity j in

each country,

(10)
Hence tariff revenue Ri(T) is given by
n

Ri(T)

= -~

J=l

tf11'J (T)Mf (T)

(11)

(12)

(13)
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Substituting (11) into (12) and solving for E1 (T),
(14)

where

(15)

(16)

Using (15), Mf(T)

aJ. (l+t 1 )V 1 (T)
,rj (T) (l+tl}

= ------ -

QJ(T) so that aggregate imports of union

members is
(17)

where Qj(T)

=

I

i:

i=l

i

Qj (T) .

With the formation of the union, let the Kemp-Wan common external tariff
on commodity j be tj.

Given identical Cobb-Douglas tastes and common domestic

prices in all members of the union, domestic demand of the union depends only
on the aggregate expenditure of E(CU) of the union as a whole.

As earlier,

aggregate expenditure is the sum of the value of production in the union at
domestic prices and tariff revenues.

With unchanged terms of trade ,r(T) and

common tariffs tJ•, imports MJ· (CU) of the union will be

ajE(CU)
-=~-~
- Q (CU)
(T)(l+t)
1rj

j
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where Qj(CU) is the sum

I
i
Qj(CU).
i=l
~

Using the analogue of (12) now for the

CU, it is easy to show that

E(CU)
where

=

(l+t)V(CU)

V(CU)

(18)
(19)

and

(20)

Substituting for E(CU) in MJ(CU), Mj(CU)

By definition of Kemp-Wan tariffs tj, net imports Mj(CU) of the union is the
same as its pre-union imports Mj(T).

Hence,

- I
aj(l+t) ~ V 1 (CU)
i=l

(21)

Then

(22)

Substituting (21) in (22) and rearranging
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aJ (l+t)
(l+tJ)

~ Vi(T)

i=l

(23)

n

+ ~ wk(T)8k
k=l

From (14) and (19) it is seen that
.,. = a- (l+t)
J
J l+t.

=

J

Since

=

n

i

~

j=l

.,. = 1

(aJ/l+tJ)
n
~ (ak/1 +tk)
k=l

and

aJ(l+ti) = (aJ/l+t})
n
l+t~
J
~
ak
k=l l+tk1

"} represent appropriately weighted and

J

normalized tariff structures, respectively of the union and of country i in
the pre-union situation.

In fact it can be shown using (10) and (14) that "J

and"} equal respectively the share of the value (at unchanged world prices)
of consumption of commodity j in the total value of consumption in the union
and country i (prior to the union).
Let wi(T)

=

·Vi(T)
I

~ Vi(T)

i=l

wj (T)8J
n
~ wk(T)8k
k=l

Thus wi(T) is the share of

country i in the value at unchanged world prices of the output of the union in
the pre-union equilibrium and wj is the share of the change in value (at
unchanged world prices) of output of commodity j in the change in the value of
output of all commodities brought about by the formation of the union and the
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induced change in domestic price structure in each of the countries.
Substituting these in (14),
I

av • wj

V(T) _l: wirj +

.i=l

(24)

V(T)+av

or

(25)

where r j

rj is the weighted

average of pre--union

according as wj

>
=

<

rj.

rj.

Now V(T) +

av

I
=

l: Vi(CU)
i=l

>

0.

If a> 0,

1'.

J

>
= 1'.
< J

Thus, if after the formation of the union, the value of

output of the union at unchanged world prices is higher than in the pre-union
equilibrium, then the. Kemp-Wan normalized tariff factor rj will exceed (resp.
fall short of) the weighted average rj of the normalized tariff factors r ji on
commodity j in the union countries prior to the formation of the union, if the
i
share wj exceeds (resp. falls short of) the same weighted average -rj.

In

particular, if wj < 0, i.e. the value of output of commodity j is lower in the
post-union situation, then rj < -1
rj.
If av < 0, then

r

<

j ;

rJ

<

according as wj ;

r

j.

In particular, if wj < 0,
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then ,,J > ,, J .

Of course av < 0 does not necessarily imply wj < 0.

It is clear from (23) that in the case of a world of pure exchange
economies in which by definition QJ(T) = QJ(CU), av will be zero and hence
,,J = ,, j.

Although one cannot compute Kemp-Wan ,, j from the pre-union data of ,,;

and V1 (T) for general production economies, if there are reasons to suggest
that changes in output following the formation of the union are unlikely to

av+llV I large, as a first order of approximation ,, j
make I V(T)

= ,, j

.

An alternative, but equivalent, approach to characterizing ,,j is to note
that under assumption of balanced trade V1 (T)

consumption of good j in country i in the pre-union situation.

Also with

unchanged net imports of good j in the union compared to the sum of net
imports of member countries in the pre-union situation, the change in value of
output aj = change in value of consumption.

Thus the weights w1 is also the

share of the value of consumption in country i to the sum of the value of
consumption in the member countries (both valued at unchanged world prices) in
the pre-union situation.

Similarly, wJ is the share of the change in value of

consumption of commodity j in the sum of the changes in the value of
consumption of all commodities, again at unchanged world prices, between the
post- and pre-union situation.

One can therefore interpret (24) using

'consumption' weights for averaging.

Thus the Kemp-Wan normalized tariff

factor "Jon commodity j will exceed, equal or fall short of the consumption
weighted average rJ of the normalized tariff factors "} on the same
commodities in the union countries in the pre-union situation according as wj
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(the share of the change in value of consumption of commodity j in the sum of
changes in the value of all commodities between the post- and pre-union
equilibria) exceeds, equals or falls short of the same

Tj•

In other words,

if the formation of the union does not lead to a significant change in the
value of consumption of all commodities, the Kemp-Wan normalized tariff factor
r j on each commodity j will equal the -Consumption weighted average

Tj.

While

this is the exact analogue of the characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs in the
simple Ricardian model, in a more complex model the analogy holds only
locally, i.e. for small changes in consumption.
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